

22 April 1960

We do not differ with your views as expressed in lc(1), (2), and (3) provided they are based on the maintenance of a status quo in the area. No assumptions for these three paragraphs are stated, whereas the remarks on page 25 of GR L-60-2 are predicated on the assumption that the delicate situations in Iraq and Iran could be upset, perhaps with the abruptness of the events of July 1958.

Your paragraphs 1c(1),(2), and ~~1c~~ (3) quoted from the memorandum of 8 April 1959 seem intended to refute statements made in GR L-60-2. Actually there is no conflict between the two, partly because they are not directly comparable. We do not take issue with your three paragraphs but we would like to point out that they are not based on any particular assumption, whereas the remarks on page 25 of GR L-60-2 are predicated on such statements as "In the event of disturbances in Iran or Iraq that would seriously impair the effectiveness of the respective armies", "Should circumstances permit", "Should the government of either Iran or Iraq fall".

A few other points should be noted. In relation to (1), while there are divisive forces associated with the development of an independent Kurdistan, an independent Kurdish state need not embrace all of Kurdistan. The original Mahabad Republic was only 100 x 75 miles in extent and located entirely in Iran. Your paragraph (2) is a very general statement and would be difficult for anyone to disagree with. The first sentence of (3) quite correctly does not deny that one of the best ways of harassing Iran would be to establish a small Soviet-oriented Kurdish state within its borders, or to attempt to establish one. Likewise the second sentence does not imply that an independent Kurdish state is inconsistent with Soviet plans for Iraq.

While DGG does not assign a high degree of probability to the establishment of a Kurdish republic, we do affirm the right ~~to remark on the situation in the Middle East and the situation in the Middle East~~ to remark about the situation according to the facts as we see them, regardless of possible conflict with previously established viewpoints,